Introduction
To manage an organization it is necessary to be aware of the implicit trade-offs between activities. It is necessary, for example, to know how much extra inputs are required in order to increase the value of an output. In the same way, it is necessary to know by how much the amount of an input should increase when the amount of another input decreases in the case when we want to keep outputs unchanged. This reasoning, taken from production theory, can also be applied when examining the choice of competitive strategy made by a firm. For example, Porter (1980) , when defining generic strategies of differentiation and costs leadership, states that a firm's current trade-offs indicate its capacity to adapt to new competitive market conditions.
In fact, according to Porter (1979, p. 215) , the concept of trade-off is already implicit in the very definition of a strategic group (henceforth an SG). Thus, it is assumed that all firms that are in the same SG will respond to a disturbance is similar ways, given that their costs of change in strategy are very similar. Similarly, Hatten and Hatten (1987) make it very clear that the cost of a change in strategy within a SG is different from the rest of the SGs in the industry.
Pursuing this viewpoint, this study introduces an alternative approach of assigning firms to SGs: firms are classified according to their capacity to respond to disturbances, where capacity to respond to disturbances is defined as the trade-offs among key decision variables. In fact, the main motivation of this paper is to demonstrate that the traditional focus of the SG literature, which groups firms according to their similarities in key strategic dimensions, can be surpassed.
In our application, we have found the taxonomy p roposed by Cool and Schendel (1987) to be very useful in the key variables selection process. Cool and Schendel classify the strategic variables into scope and resource commitments variables. Later, this classification turns out to be of great help in the use of the non-parametric, Data Envelopment Analysis models (DEA) to determine the response capacity of each strategic group. The initial DEA model was proposed by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978) . A DEA model performs comparisons among organisations ( referred to as decision making units, DMUs), which use similar compositions of inputs to obtain similar compositions of outputs.
In our case, the DMUs are banking firms, the inputs are resource commitments and the outputs are dimensions of scope. The result i s the construction of an empirical frontier, the configuration of which is defined by different firms sharing the same commitment of resources in order to reach the maximum scope; i.e. to participate in a greater number of market segments, to offer a greater number of products in these markets, or to extend the geographic reach of its strategy. If a firm lies on the frontier (say, there is no other DMU producing more outputs by consuming equal or lower inputs for a given set of outputs), it is labelled a strategic leader (SL). If not, it is a strategic follower (SF). DEA provides efficiency scores, and for SFs a set of peers that are obtained by projecting them on to the frontier.
There exists a broad research stream using DEA models to evaluate efficiency in banking (see, for instance, Grifell-Tatje and Lovell, 1997, or Pastor et al., 1997) . However, as far as we know, previous literature using the DEA methodology to determine strategic groups is truly scarce. Day et al. (1994 Day et al. ( , 1995 reveal the indubitable advantages of this technique. In particular, they highlight the capacity to consider multiple outputs or the establishment of a nexus between inputs and output when firms pursue multiple objectives. Their proposal is valuable because it introduces a clear and objective criterion for identifying strategic groups.
It does, however, suffer from severe limitations: depending on the line segment to which they are projected, two practically identical firms can end up being classified in different SGs.
This paper applies DEA to identify strategic groups, but from a different viewpoint.
To us, a SG is a set of firms that are similar because of the way they value inputs and outputs.
This shifts the emphasis to the determination of weights. Thus, our proposal consists of grouping together firms according to similarities in their relative valuation of key decision variables (the trade-offs between the relative weights). However, there are two technical problems that must be addressed first. First, for each efficient firm there is not just one but a multiple number of weights that could be used. Second, for DMUs that do not form part of the frontier, the weights are undefined. This paper is organised as follows. Besides this introduction, there are five remaining sections. The second section gives an analysis of the theoretical foundations of the SGs and closes with a proposal that helps to resolve the problems that arise when Cluster Analysis is used directly to establish SGs. In the Section 3, a variant of the non-parametric DEA models is developed to determine the existing trade-offs between each pair of strategic variables.
Section 4 is methodological: It comprises a description of the sample, the strategic decision variables and the selection of marginal rates required to determine the presence of SGs in the banking industry. The results of the empirical application are reported in Section 5. The article ends with a synthesis of the principal conclusions.
The Strategic Group concept: Multidimensionality and Causality of the strategy
The concept of SG was introduced by Hunt in 1972, although later contributions (namely Caves and Porter, 1977 and Porter, 1979) defined the principal elements of the theory. According to Porter (1979) , the concept of the SG serves to distinguish a group of firms with similar strategies that, in turn, are different from those followed by other firms in the same industry. Thus, the strategic decisions made by a firm within a SG cannot be imitated by firms outside the group without substantial costs (monetary, time or uncertainty about the outcome of such decisions). Accordingly, the existence of SGs requires the existence of barriers to imitation (Caves and Porter, 1977 and Porter, 1979) . These groupspecific entry barriers, the so-called " barriers to mobility", give protection to group members, and explain why some firms obtain positive economic benefits from adopting intra-group strategies while others do not. Without such barriers, successful strategies could be imitated quickly, resulting in loss of performance differentials (Porter, 1979) . From this viewpoint, mobility barriers could be interpreted as the penalty costs of moving from one SG to another: high mobility barriers mean the expected costs of any attempt to change group membership are high, which leads to lower expected profitability. This eliminates the incentives to change among SGs and deters entry into groups (Hatten and Hatten, 1987) .
Obviously, there is a price to pay for changing strategies; and the more dissimilar a strategy is, the more it will cost to imitate it. Hence, firms in the same group will find it less costly to behave like the rest of the group members. In contrast, barriers to mobility between groups imply that non-members suffer a high cost for copying the strategies of the group to which they do not belong. Consequently, each SG comprises firms following similar strategies about key variables. This is also consistent with the definition by McGee and Thomas (1986) of an SG as a group of firms responding in the same way to environmental disturbances. The result of this homogeneity is that a specific strategic dimension acquires increasing importance while other dimensions have decreasing importance. In contrast, when we compare firms forming part of different SGs, the barriers (the costs of imitation) depend upon the relative circumstances of each firm, as costs functions may be asymmetric (Hatten and Hatten, 1987) .
It follows from the previous discussion that a strategic group can be defined as a set of firms that organize themselves in the same way and react in a unified way to the same external influences. This is, precisely, the definition of SG we are interested in utilizing throughout the paper.
Basically, the SG framework relies on barriers to mobility to account for persistent intra-industry performance variation (Porter, 1979) . Although the existing literature has had relative success in the identification of groups of firms with different strategies (i.e., dissimilarities in the collective behavior between groups), no conclusive empirical evidence exists for the hypothesized group-performance linkage (McGee and Thomas, 1986; Venkatraman, 1988, and Barney and Hoskisson, 1990) . There are two possible explanations for the weak empirical evidence on the performance implications associated with group membership. One possibility is that the relationship has not been captured adequately (due to poor specification of the model). The other possibility is simply that no such linkage exists (see, for instance, the work of Hatten and Hatten, 1987 , who assume the concept of SG exists as an analytical convenience). Being more optimistic than Hatten and Hatten, and assuming that SG is something more than a methodological artifact, the literature identifies to two essential problems. First, there has been limited progress towards an acceptable definition of the concept of SG (Cool and Schendel, 1987) . Recently, this lack of progress has led to the suggestion of new theoretical approaches to define SG such as, for example, the cognitive perspective (see Fombrun and Zajac, 1987) or the resource determinants of performance differences (see Dierickx and Cool, 1989, and Mehra, 1996) . The second problem identified is that the methodology for treating the data is inadequate (Ketchen and Shook, 1996) ; and the habitual use of cluster analysis is criticised Venkatraman, 1988, and Barney and Hoskisson, 1990) . Day et al. (1994 Day et al. ( , 1995 illustrate the crucial weakness of this technique by showing that when firms are designing strategies; in fact, managers cognise a causal model (i.e. a transformation function) relating, in a more or less conscious manner, operational decisions with the attainment of an objective function. Furthermore, Day et al. (1994 Day et al. ( , 1995 report that firms are typically driven by multiple goals: not just profit maximization. Therefore, Cluster Analysis is an inadequate technique because i) it does not capture the multidimensionality of strategy; ii) it does not take into account the relative importance of the key decision variables (Hatten and Hatten, 1987) ; and iii) because it does not allow the incorporation the inherent causality of the definition of strategy (Thomas and Venkatraman, 1988) .
From the discussion of the literature below, it is our belief that a) it is necessary to identify the causal model which helps to identify the characteristics of the transformation function between the strategic variables; b) it is important to know the relative weights of the key decision variables (i.e., the t rade-offs between the variables) in order to test the existence of mobility barriers among different SGs; and finally c) it is beneficial to identify the strategic leaders ( DMUs forming the frontier) and strategic followers ( DMUs that are inefficient, despite forming part of the same SG).
Given this conception of SG, the next section explains how to use DEA models in order to achieve the three objectives just mentioned.
Using DEA to assess response ability
Here, we attempt to eliminate the limitations raised in the previous section by using DEA models. Our final goal is the proposition of a three-stage process, which tries to avoid the direct Cluster Analysis of the original variables. In the first stage, DEA is used to assess the degree of efficiency of each firm, allowing each firm to convert inputs into outputs autonomously. DEA efficiency scores are obtained by radially projecting all DMUs on to the frontier. A firm lying on the frontier is efficient. Such a firm is, as mentioned earlier, socalled a " strategic leader", or SL. Otherwise, the DMU is inefficient and is thus a "strategic follower", or SF. In the latter case, the efficiency score quantify the percentage by which the SF should increase proportionally all its outputs in order to become efficient. In the second stage, the relative importance of the variables (trade-offs) is computed. Finally, Cluster Analysis of the trade-offs is then employed to identify the strategic groups.
Let us begin with the most standard DEA model (Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes, 1978 
∑∑
From this, the production possibility set can be described in terms of 1) the marginal rate of substitution between inputs ( MRS), 2) the marginal rate of transformation between outputs (MRT), 3) the marginal productivity of outputs relative to inputs, 4) the marginal cost of inputs relative to outputs and 5) the elasticity of substitution; see Rosen et al. (1998) and Cooper, Park and Pastor (2000) .
However, when DMU φ is efficient (h=1 φ ), the virtual weights may not be unique.
Thus, we cannot directly use the weights obtained from [1] as input or output shadow prices (Rosen et al., 1998) . Nevertheless, program [1] distinguishes between efficient and inefficient DMUs. It is most interesting to provide an alternative approach to weights computation: The next section is devoted to the identification of a harmonized set of weights for efficient DMUs.
For h=1 φ we can say that DMU φ is a strategic leader (SL) that lies on the frontier.
When h<1 φ , DMU φ is not on the frontier and we say that φ is a strategic follower (SF). A strategic follower can proportionally contract its inputs by h φ , while still producing at least the same level of outputs.
Response capacity of strategic leaders
As has been pointed out, SG is defined here as a set of firms that convert inputs into outputs while placing an identical valuation on the variables. This is why firms in the same SG will present identical reactions to the same external stimuli; or, in other words, why they present similarities in their response capacity.
Since DEA weights reveal a firm's order of preferences for decision variables, the importance of weights indicates a firm's relative valuation of inputs and outputs. From this, we define response capacity as the t rade-offs among weights. These trade-offs are very informative because marginal relations between variables equal the negative inverse of weights ratios.
Let DMU φ be a SL whose decisions on the M dimensions of scope and the virtual prices associated with each one of them are labeled as, respectively, ,. The graphical analysis is portrayed in Figure 1 . As shown, the ratio between the virtual prices k u and l u represents the partial derivatives on the frontier. Thus, the output weights trade-off determines a tangency point between the pricing hyperplane and the production possibility frontier (PPF) at point C.
Conceptually, MRTs indicate the slope of the production possibilities frontier in each
. Given the assumption of linear technology in DEA models, this implies that multiple pairs of virtual prices are acceptable for all SLs (Rosen et al., 1998; and Cooper, Seiford and Tone, 2000) . Thus, we cannot directly use the weights from program [1] .
[ Figure 1 about here]
In an attempt to find ways to order the MRTs, Rosen et al. (1998) with discontinuous derivatives at the extreme efficient points), Rosen et al.'s proposal (1998) is to compute the derivatives on the right and on the left, that is the minimum and maximum ratios of weights (or MRs) at a point, where χ is nonnegative and P ( ) Pr ⊂ refers to all strategic leaders. Furthermore, when k, l are outputs, then MR refers to the MRT between outputs. Hence, MR + or the derivative of output k to output l, at a point φ ( )
on the right, corresponds to the minimum marginal rate of transformation or the absolute value of the maximum MRT (MR − corresponds to the absolute value of the maximum or the minimum). The first set of restrictions insures that the firm is situated on the frontier; the second set guarantees that no other firm has an efficiency coefficient greater than one.
The proposal by Rosen et al. (1998) , which is graphically portrayed in Figure 2 , is based upon the computation of the maximum ( ) β and minimum ( ) α slope for each vertex;
that is the value for the ratio between the greater and lower virtual prices, respectively.
[ Figure 2 about here]
In our application, we choose as MRT the value MR − (the derivative of the PPF on the left) in order to avoid infinite values (see in Figure 2 that the maximum MRT of DMU C is β).
Program [2] also allows for the identification of the virtual prices of the committed resources. With this, we can also determine the inputs marginal rates of substitution, MRSs.
This time, to avoid infinite values, we choose the minimum MRSs (derivative on the left).
Nevertheless, as Rosen et al. (1998) [ Figure 3 about here]
Response capacity of strategic followers
Consider now the situation of strategic followers (SFs). Here problems arise because the approach presented in the previous section does not work and MRTs cannot be computed.
This is due to the fact that MRTs represent partial derivatives on the frontier (slopes on the PPF at particular points) while SFs, as inefficient DMUs, are in the interior of the production possibility set (Cooper, Park and Pastor, 2000) .
Another problem related with SFs is that virtual prices assigned by program [1] define an identical MRT for all firms projected to the same linear segment of the PPF. This means that these inefficient firms, their respective positions vis-à-vis the frontier notwithstanding, could appear as if they were in the same SG.
These two limitations can be resolved by using interpolation to determine the weights of inefficient DMUs. The interpolation we propose helps to resolve the common microeconomic problem of lack of marginal rates for interior points. Usually, DEA cannot distinguish between MRTs for firms sharing the same technological references (they are projected on the same linear segment of the frontier). Consequently, our approach is a new contribution to DEA research because it allows us to differentiate between them since each inefficient firm is assigned to a specific MRT based on the composition of its respective activity vector.
Spanish Banking data

The Sample of Banks
Annual data were collected about a sample of two types of banks: Savings and Commercial. Data for savings banks were collected from the publication "Anuario Estadístico de las Cajas de Ahorros Confederadas" published by "Confederación Española de
Cajas de Ahorros". The data for commercial banks were obtained from the report "Anuario Estadístico de la Banca Privada" published by "Consejo Superior Bancario". Our initial observation was that the quality levels between the two sources were diverse: the data for Savings banks were considerably better. We, therefore, proceeded to analyse the reliability of the data. As a result, the final sample was reduced to 62 Commercial banks and 47 Savings banks. This is much smaller than the original population. There were four main reasons for exclusion: the absence of data (21 commercial banks and 2 saving banks); the elimination of foreign banking branches (51 commercial banks); the presence of inconsistent data (7 commercial banks); and the elimination of outliers. The elimination of outliers was executed as follows:
Outlier detection is a basic requirement prior to any DEA application. It is common knowledge that the analysis of efficiency with deterministic models is very sensitive to the presence of outliers in the sample. This is due to the fact that the extreme points determine the efficiency frontier and could affect the marginal rates of the rest of the DMUs. To control for extreme observations, we applied an iterative process, based on Andersen and Petersen's (1993) super-efficiency coefficient. As Wilson (1995) points out, in the output-oriented DEA program, excluding units with low values of the super-efficiency coefficient produces the largest shift in the position of the frontier. Following this reasoning, we ranked units in increasing order of their super-efficiency coefficients. This enabled us to identify, and then remove, the DMU with the lowest value. We then re-calculated the efficiencies and compared the two samples, i.e. the before and the after the DMU exclusion: if we found the difference of the efficiency coefficient between the two samples to be statistically significant, we
proceeded to remove such a unit. We then repeated the whole process anew, and so on: the iteration ended when the null hypothesis of equality of the efficiency coefficients could not be rejected. Evidently, our procedure is an extension of Wilson's (1995) proposal 2 . The final outcome of the application of this iterative process was the elimination of 12 banking firms (11 commercial banks and 1 Savings bank).
Strategic variables and marginal rates
As indicated in Section 2, we have followed the concept of the SG defined, first, by Hofer and Schendel (1978) and, later, applied by Cool and Schendel (1987) . Hofer and Schendel (1978, p. 25) define the strategy of a firm as "the present and future pattern of deploying of resources and interactions with the environment (scope of the strategy) which indicate how the organization will achieve its objectives", where "the decisions upon scope of the strategy and deploying of resources determine competitive advantage and synergy" 1 .
Under this definition o f strategy, a SG feeds from "a set of firms competing within an industry on the basis of similar combinations of scope and resource commitments" Schendel, 1987, p. 1106) . The decisions about scope include the choice of the segments of the firm's target market, the product-mix offered in these markets and the geographic reach of the strategy. With regard to the committed resources, human, material and financial resources support the business strategy of the firm. A firm's competitive advantage is t he result of its positioning in the product-market segments in which it participates and of how it applies its resources and capacities in each one of them; and is defined as "the advantageous position of a firm vis-à-vis its competitors by means of its decisions over resources and/or scope" (Hofer and Schendel, 1978) .
Following the proposal of Hofer and Schendel (1978) , we summarize the most common variables generally used in previous studies devoted to the identification of SGs in the banking industry (see Walter, 1988 and Mehra, 1996) . With regard to the scope of the strategy, the multi-product nature of the banking firm can be measured in three global aspects, namely: 1) product scope, 2) geographical reach and 3) customer proximity:
(1). Product scope
This dimension of the strategy is captured by six variables:
(S1): (commercial loans)/(financial investments)
This ratio captures a bank's orientation towards commercial banking, specialisation in domestic economies and in small and medium firms.
(S2): (portfolio of securities)/(financial investments)
This ratio determines the extent of banking firm's orientation towards active investments in stock markets.
(S3): (liquid assets)/(financial investments)
This ratio indicates the degree of conservatism in the banking activity (maintaining liquid assets avoids risky investments).
(S4): (commissions due to financial services)/(products of financial activity)
Ratio reflecting the diversification away from the traditional banking business towards innovative banking focused in different services and financial intermediation.
(S5): (Savings and deposit accounts of the private sector)/(total liabilities)
This ratio distinguishes between the traditional and conservative banking business, based on the traditional accumulation of family Savings.
(S6): (net position in financial markets)/(total liabilities)
Reflects a novel and aggressive way of capturing funds by means of sophisticated formulas, such as, for instance, the use of the interbank market.
(2). Geographical reach
This dimension investigates the extent of the inter-regional presence of each bank. To measure geographical reach; we compute the Herfindahl index by calculating the ratio of the number of branches of each bank in every Spanish province to the total n umber of bank branches. Formally, the index is defined as:
iji j1 HNN0H1 = =≤≤ ∑ [6] where ij N is the number of branches of the banking firm evaluated in province j and i N is the total number of branches of this bank.
The specific variable used in the DEA evaluation is:
(3). Proximity to customers
The aim of this variable is to capture differences between commercial and saving banks.
As reported by Canals (1994) , and also by Prior (2003) , where ij N is the number of branches in province j for the DMU under evaluation and j N is the total number of branches in this province.
To determine the characteristics of the inputs, we again follow the lead of Cool and Schendel (1987) : We define three variables measuring a firm's commitment of physical, human and financial resources:
(R1) Physical capital: (depreciation and amortization expenses)/(operating income)
This variable captures the importance of the direct costs of fixed assets (buildings and information technology) as a percentage of the operating income.
(R2) Human capital: (personnel expenses)/(operating income)
This variable captures the importance of h uman resources as a percentage of the operating income.
(R3) Credit quality: (loan loss provisions and write-offs)/(operating income)
This ratio reflects the risk inherent in a bank's strategy and the quality of its loans.
Contrarily to Mehra (1996) , we do not introduce any specific variable to represent the structure of liabilities because the deposits and financing coming from the inter-banking market already figure among the scope variables, and, as such, they would be redundant.
The descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1 .
[ Table 1 about here]
Once the variables measuring the scope of the strategy and the resources committed have been defined, the next step is to select the trade-offs to be used in the Cluster Analysis to determine the SGs. According to the theory, the following are the most significant tradeoffs that take place among the scope variables:
(S1/S2) Commercial loans versus portfolio of securities
This trade-off points out the dichotomy between commercial banking and investment banking.
(S1/S3) Commercial loans in respect to treasury
This MRT serves to distinguish between banks specialising in domestic economies and SMFs from those whose investment is focused in financial markets.
(S3/S2) Treasury and portfolio of securities
This is a relationship that identifies, by exploring the strategy of investing assets, risk-taking behaviour.
(S5/S6) Savings and deposit accounts with respect to financial intermediaries
This ratio clarifies the different strategies that can be used to raise funds.
(S2/S4) Investment banking vis-à-vis innovative banking
This ratio accounts for the disparity between a specialized bank with a narrow range of services and a diversified bank that offers a comprehensive level of financial services.
This captures the conflict between a strategy of disseminating throughout the whole country as opposed to one of focusing on a single province to achieve a greater level of proximity to the client.
With regard to the trade-offs among resources variables, two MRs have been chosen:
(R1/R2) Physical capital in relation to human resources
This MR captures the potential dichotomy between a capital-intensive technology and a more labor-intensive one.
(R2/R3) Human resources with respect to credit quality
Relates the expenses due to insolvencies with personnel expense. The rationale behind this is that a greater investment in human capital reinforces supervision, and this should be reflected in improvements in the quality of the operations.
Analysis
The first part of the analysis was to quantify marginal rates. This was executed by identifying the response capacity of each firm using the methodology described in Section 3.
Next, an array matrix of MRT and MRS was obtained for each institution by, initially, applying the standard DEA program to obtain the weights followed by the application of Once the MRs corresponding to each DMU were known, Cluster Analysis was performed on the basis of the weights. As Ketchen and Shook (1996) note, previous research has generally relied on Ward's method to cluster firms. However, this method tends to produce clusters with roughly the same number of observations, with solutions that tend to be heavily distorted by outliers. To overcome this problem, a solution, advocated in many academic papers (see, for instance, Punj and Stewart, 1983) , is to use a two-stage process where a hierarchical algorithm is used to define the number of clusters. The initial results serve as the starting points for iterative partitioning in the second stage.
A correct identification of the number of clusters is indispensable. Thus, multiple methods (Ward, Centroid, Median, Single Linkage, Complete Linkage and Average Linkage)
were employed in the first stage in order to propose different possible partitions of the sample. From these results, two different tests were carried out. The first was a rule of thumb for selecting the number of clusters proposed by Harrigan (1985) . Harrigan's proposal involves the examination of the tightness of the groups. For example, using the 2 R , the contribution that an additional group would make to the overall fit of the clusters is examined. The process is iterative, the stopping rule being an increase in 2 R lower than 5%.
The second method we used is Fiegenbaum and Thomas's (1990) stopping rule: The clusters obtained must explain at least 65 percent of the overall variance, while any additional cluster must add less than 5 percent to the incremental variance explained. Finally, we reversed the procedure. We used Discriminant Analysis to calculate the percentage of firms correctly classified in the identified number of groups. Together, these processes allowed us to identify the appropriate number of strategic groups in existence.
In the second stage, starting from the number of identified strategic groups, each firm was assigned to a group using the non-hierarchical K-means algorithm. The non-hierarchical K-means algorithm has some interesting advantages over hierarchical methods: it is less impacted by outliers and its final solution optimizes within-clusters homogeneity and between-clusters heterogeneity (Ketchen and Shook, 1996) . However, the K-means algorithm has an important shortcoming: It requires that the number of clusters be specified a priori.
But, in our case, this has already been solved Finally, to examine whether differences in the selected dimensions exist among the identified SGs, a MANOVA was carried out. Differences among groups for each variable were verified using ANOVA. Additionally, we used Discriminant Analysis to give robustness to our segmentation of the sample.
Strategic groups in Spanish banking industry
Strategic groups based on marginal rates
Cluster Analysis results suggested that the sample should be divided into five strategic groups, as shown in Table 2 . The detailed composition of the groups can be found in Appendix 2.
[ Table 2 about here]
Inspection of the centroids of each SG reveals that, generally, SG2 has the lowest ratios, indicating lower costs of strategy change. This result is reasonable when we look at the type of firms that make up the group: They are principally large banks and large Savings banks, which conform to the model of universal banking and have greater capacity to change their strategies.
At the other extreme, SG1 and SG5 (specialized banking) have greater restrictions on changing their strategy in that they face greater costs of change. For SG1, the greater cost of change from commercial loans to treasury (high S3/S1 trade-off) indicates that this group places higher value on strategies oriented towards domestic economies and SMEs than on avoiding risk and saving on operating costs. SG1 places the greatest value on the trade-off between treasury and portfolio of securities (S3/S2) than the other groups, reaffirming a risktaking approach. Further still, it is unlikely that SG1 can change its strategy from investment banking (S2) to commercial banking (S1) because for every reduction of one monetary unit i n their stocks portfolio, there are important compensations in terms of loans. In other words, for SG1, investments in securities are more valuable than money lending. This group also has the greatest costs of strategy change from commercial loans (S1) to treasury (S3), from portfolio of securities (S2) to treasury (S3), from human resources (R2) to production technology (R1) and from human resources (R2) to credit quality (R3). Due to the last trade-off, this cluster could be labeled as risky banking. Its high valuation of human capital reinforces this business orientation, as we can see from the trade-offs from physical capital ( R1) to human capital (R2), and also, from credit quality (R3) to human capital (R2).
SG5 can be labeled as wholesale banking. It is characterized by a focus on geographical reach rather than concentration in a single province (high S7/S8 ratio). It also has the greatest costs of strategy change between the following pairs of the variables:
commercial loans ( S1) to portfolio of securities ( S2), commissions ( S4) to portfolio of securities (S2) and productive technology (R1) to human resources (R2). These ratios suggest that SG5 values a strategy of security investment ( S1) more than one of specializing in domestic economies and in SMEs ( S2); and also more than the usual diversification of traditional banking (S4). When relate the capacity or costs of strategy change to the indicators of results, we observe that the SGs experiencing the greatest difficulties in attempting to change the orientation of their strategies have, simultaneously, the worse results. At the opposite extreme SG2, which had the greatest flexibility in the orientation of its strategy, also enjoys the best results. This observation holds no matter which indicator we use.
Strategic groups based on Cluster Analysis of original decision variables
Our aim now is to compare the SGs obtained through the proposed method with those obtained from the traditional application of Cluster Analysis on the original strategic variables as this allows us to establish how well each method performs in determining market segmentation.
Using the previously defined two-stage procedure, Cluster Analysis was applied to the original strategic variables. The results are presented in Table 3 , while the composition of SGs is tabulated in Appendix 2. A MANOVA and a Discriminant Analysis were carried out to examine the model's ability to separate the observations. Additionally, ANOVA analysis was used to test the significance of t he strategic variables among the proposed strategic groups.
As can be seen, a six-cluster solution was obtained.
[ Table 3 about here]
Allow us now to comment briefly on the results obtained. SG1 represents commercial banking, including the largest Spanish banking firms. They have a broad branch network, emphasizing their focus on retail banking. However, these firms are universal banks and it is not surprising that they also have some business in wholesale banking (for example, portfolio of securities). SG1 is characterized by a focus on commercial loans, obtaining funds from the interbanking market.
The banks in SG2 are characterised by innovative banking. The firms in this group have a very high proportion of earnings from financial services rather than from loans or investments.
SG3 appears to be oriented towards wholesale banking. It is characterized by a focus on attracting funds by means of sophisticated formulas and functioning as a resource to the interbanking market. We also find foreign banks, in SG3, that have a poor market quota despite a broad geographical reach, a pattern possibly following the lead of foreign firms.
The key feature of SG4 is Investment banking. Rather than commercial loans, this SG is focused on securities investments and on treasury. Where the strategy about liabilities is concerned, SG4 banks capture funds using aggressive sophisticated formulas. They are also sparsely spread across geographical markets.
The orientation in SG5 is intermediation banking: SG5 members generally capture funds through traditional and conservative formulas (Savings and deposit accounts of the private sector), which they then convert into commercial loans. This is, clearly, a low-risk strategy.
Finally, SG6 clusters small Savings banks, where Savings and deposits accounts occupy a dominant place. Furthermore, other key characteristics of their strategy are high security investments-most likely in SMEs, some commercial activity and treasury endowments and no risk. The firms in this group are small, b oth in physical and human capital terms.
From the point of view of the performance-group membership linkage, a look at the results in Table 3 suggests that there are no substantial performance differentials across groups. More specifically, the ANOVA test shows that groups formed by clustering on the original variables do not exhibit significant differences for the ROA (return on assets). In contrast, for the ROE (return on equity) and the GP/OM (gross profit/ordinary margin), the group differences are significant at the 5 percent level.
Performance analysis
Strategic group theory suggests that long-lasting firm profitability derives from the structure of the industry and that strategic group membership is the primary source of persistent differences i n the performance of firms. Our goal here is to examine the extent of statistical association between group membership and performance indicators. A univariate ANOVA test was conducted to examine the association between structure of the industry and the performance of firms. To study the extent of the variability of the indicators that could be explained by strategic group membership, 2 R tests were computed for each performance indicator.
Following Mehra (1996) , we verify in this section how much better our proposal of determining SGs having started from MRs is at explaining the variability of results than the "traditional" application of Cluster Analysis to the initial strategic variables. The results of this comparison can found in Table 4 . To be able to compare the segmentations from both methods, we re recalculated the six-cluster solution obtained from the original strategic variables clustering (model 2B in Table 4 ) in order to impose a division of the sample into five different groups. Model 2A in Table 4 contains the results obtained.
[ Table 4 about here]
From Table 4 , it is evident that SGs based on marginal rates show significant differences across the three performance indicators: The clusters explain almost 21 percent of the ROA variance, nearly 17 percent of ROE variance, and upwards of 15 percent of the productivity ratio (gross profit/ordinary margin) variance. On the other hand, the capacity of SGs based on clustering on the original variables to explain the variability of the sample depends on the indicator chosen and on the number of clusters considered. Specifically, the five-group solution is only significant across one of the performance measures, and only at the 10 percent level. However, when six clusters are considered, the groups are significantly different across all performance dimensions, although the SGs capacity to explain performance differences between groups is still lower than strategic groups based on MRs.
The general conclusion that can be drawn from the results shown in Table 4 is that, if one of the requisites for accepting the notion of SG is the ability to explain differences in results (say, the association between group membership and performance), then the segmentation of banking firms as a function of their strategic response capacity ( MRs) exhibits a stronger fit. In other words, SGs based on MRs explain a higher percentage of intraindustry performance variance than those obtained from the standard application of cluster analysis on the initial variables.
These results reflect a positive relation between the response capacity of banks and superior performance. A joint analysis of SG characteristics and results clearly reveals that firms with lower cost of strategy change (i.e., low marginal r ates) enjoy competitive advantage. This case is very well represented by SG3.
Conclusions
The concept of a strategic group has merited a great deal of attention within the strategic management and industrial organization literature (McGee and Thomas, 1986 ).
Explaining differences in the performance of firms is a fundamental goal of both of these types of literature. Yet still, there is debate in the literature about how strategic groups should be identified (Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1990) . To address this uncertainty, this study has developed a framework for identifying SGs, and has then applied the framework to test whether the hypothesis of no differences in performance across groups can be supported. The paper has also proved empirically that this framework has a greater ability to explain intraindustry performance differences than the traditional analysis.
Our main objective is to find a way to take into account inefficiency when classifying firms into SGs. The basic proposition of this paper is that f irms use given inputs in order to achieve certain results, and do so following different strategies. From this, it follows that firms in the same group convert inputs into outputs in the same way, and consequently, a SG can be defined as a set of firms that value inputs and outputs in the same way. In this context, DEA is an excellent tool for segmentation. There are two main reasons to support this assertion. First, using DEA efficiency scores calculated for each DMU, comparisons can be made between firms that use similar inputs-outputs mix. Second, differences in strategies imply differences in the importance attached to key decision variables. These differences can be perfectly captured through DEA weights. But, usually, there is a problem with DEA weights. They exhibit multiplicity. We have, however, shown in this paper how this limitation can be resolved. Another problem is that weights cannot be computed for inefficient firms because they are in the interior of the production possibility set (Cooper, Park and Pastor, 2000) . This problem can, however, be easily overcome by using interpolation and assigning a linear combination of efficient firms' weights to the inefficient ones.
We have been able to test the proposed method through an empirical study of the Spanish banking industry. First, DEA was use to identify the strategic leaders (firms lying on the frontier) and to quantify the MRs, which indicate the relative importance of weights with respect to the key decision variables. Then, Cluster Analysis was used to group the banks on the basis of the MRs. Finally, statistical tests were employed to investigate whether any differences in the performance and decision variables are present between the firms.
The results confirmed the potential contribution o f our proposal towards a better understanding of the characteristics of SGs. To verify this, we studied the strategic groups defined to observe the presence of efficient banks and also for their ability to maximize between-group differences. Differences between SGs were identified for all the specified performance indicators. In order to increase our knowledge about the properties of our proposal, we compared the SGs composition we had obtained with the one obtained in the traditional way of Cluster Analysis based directly on the strategic variables. The results state clearly that the segmentation made on the basis of MRs exhibits a stronger fit because it explains a more substantial percentage of intra-industry performance variance.
Summing up, on the one hand, the SGs obtained using the MRs are very different from those obtained from clustering on the original strategic variables. This empirical evidence suggests that, for the identification of clusters, it is not just the decisions on the productmarket dimension that are important but also the relative importance given to these decisions.
On the other hand, our proposal is concurrent with very recent literature devoted to the definition of SGs. We now present two examples to clarify this. First, following the cognitive perspective, it is necessary to consider the managers' perspectives on how some firms follow similar strategies (Fombrun and Zajac, 1987) . In our specific case, the weights system determines for each firm how managers value their key strategic variables. Thus, firms sharing similar valuation systems determine the configuration of SGs. Second, following the resources perspective; SGs have to be defined as clusters of firms with similar resources configuration (Mehra, 1996) . Our proposal incorporates the existing relationship between inputs and outputs to define SGs.
MRs provide precise information about the preferences over decision variables made by a group of DMUs. Obviously, it is possible to anticipate changes in a firm's strategy, but these changes are not necessarily congruent with performance maximization: if two firms use inputs and outputs in a very different way (say, they belong to separate SGs) and both groups show desirable performance, the convergence between groups never occurs. This explains two usual occurrences: 1) why some firms in an industry achieve greater profits than others;
and 2) why firms maintain different strategies in spite of trying to move to other, apparently more successful, strategies. We can interpret the lack of convergence between groups as a sign of the presence of barriers to mobility. As Hatten and Hatten (1987) pointed out, barriers to mobility should be understood as the costs associated with an eventual change of SG, and such costs should be compared to the potential profits. A preliminary approximation of how important these barriers are in the Spanish banking industry suggests that the performance differences between firms are going to be maintained. The framework proposed in this research opens a new line in the identification of barriers to mobility in the literature of SGs.
We hope to extend it in the near future Standard deviations are seen in parentheses. Maintaining the original program of Rosen et al. (1998) , the restrictions added provide bounded solutions (strictly positive in the case of minimization) upon establishing the requirement of equal distance separating successive virtual weights.
S1: (commercial loans)/(financial investments). S2: (portfolio of securities)/(financial investments). S3: (treasury)/(financial investments). S4: (commissions)/(products of financial activity). S5: (Savings and deposit accounts)/(total liabilities). S6: (net position in financial markets)/(total liabilities
